萧条经济中的财政政策

Fiscal Policy in a Depressed Economy

Brookings Papers on Economic Activity · 2012
被引 820 · 同刊同年前 4%
人大 A-ABS 3

中文导读

在短期名义利率为零下限、失业率高企的萧条经济中,扩张性财政政策可能通过减少滞后效应而自我融资,即使不能,也极可能通过提高未来潜在产出的现值而通过成本收益检验。

Abstract

In a depressed economy, with short-term nominal interest rates at their zero lower bound, ample cyclical unemployment, and excess capacity, increased government purchases would be neither offset by the monetary authority raising interest rates nor neutralized by supply-side bottlenecks. Then even a small amount of hysteresis—even a small shadow cast on future potential output by the cyclical downturn—means, by simple arithmetic, that expansionary fiscal policy is likely to be self-financing. Even if it is not, it is highly likely to pass the sensible benefit-cost test of raising the present value of future potential output. Thus, at the zero bound, where the central bank cannot or will not but in any event does not perform its full role in stabilization policy, fiscal policy has the stabilization policy mission that others have convincingly argued it lacks in normal times. Whereas many economists have assumed that the path of potential output is invariant to even a deep and prolonged downturn, the available evidence raises a strong fear that hysteresis is indeed a factor. Although nothing in our analysis calls into question the importance of sustainable fiscal policies, it strongly suggests the need for caution regarding the pace of fiscal consolidation.

零利率下限财政乘数滞后效应财政扩张自我融资