Collective Choice and Voluntary Provision of Public Goods*
建立了一个公共与私人混合供给模型，研究家庭如何通过投票决定所得税和是否允许私人贡献，发现多数人总是支持允许私人贡献，尽管这可能减少总供给。
Some public goods are provided entirely with private contributions, others with a mixture of public and private funding, and still others are entirely publicly funded. In order to study this variation, a model of dual provision is developed that endogenizes public and private funding. Households vote over an income tax that finances public supply of the good and on whether to permit private contributions. While permitting private contributions may lead to a reduction in total provision, a majority always favors permitting private contributions. Results are developed for small and large economies, and the relevance of nonexcludability and noncongestion are investigated.