What Determines the Value of Corporate Votes?
研究美国公司投票权价值的决定因素，发现投票价格取决于控制权争夺中投票者预期获得的额外支付，该支付受投票成为关键票的概率和控制公司的私人利益大小影响。
This paper studies the determinants of the value of voting rights in U. S. corporations. Results support the hypothesis that the price of a vote is determined by the expected additional payment vote holders will receive for their votes in case of a control contest. The size of this differential payment is a function of the probability that a vote is pivotal in a control contest and the magnitude of the private benefits obtainable by controlling the company. Simple proxies for these two factors explain up to 30 percent of the variation of the voting premium across companies and through time. My findings also suggest that the value of managerial perquisites are, at least partially, reflected in the price of votes.