Simultaneous Signalling to the Capital and Product Markets
分析一家知情企业在融资合同被资本市场和竞争对手同时观察到时，如何选择财务结构。主要结论是合理的资本市场均衡会最大化该企业内生毛利润的事前期望，且常出现混同均衡。
In this article we analyze an informed firm's choice of financial structure when the financing contract is observed not only by the capital market but also by a second uninformed party, such as a competing firm. The informed firm's gross profit is endogenous, because the second party's action depends on the transaction it observes between the informed firm and the capital market. The main result is that the reasonable capital-market equilibria maximize the ex ante expectation of the informed firm's endogenous gross profits. In distinct contrast to earlier work, which focuses on separating equilibria, in our model it is often the case that all the reasonable equilibria are pooling.