Is Fairly Priced Deposit Insurance Possible?
分析在私有信息和道德风险下，风险敏感且激励相容的存款保险定价是否可行，发现除非存款保险机构是经济中最不厌恶风险的参与者，否则在竞争、放松监管的环境中无法实现。
ABSTRACT We analyze risk‐sensitive, incentive‐compatible deposit insurance in the presence of private information and moral hazard. Without deposit‐linked subsidies it is impossible to implement risk‐sensitive, incentive‐compatible deposit insurance pricing in a competitive, deregulated environment, except when the deposit insurer is the least risk averse agent in the economy. We establish this formally in the context of an insurance scheme in which privately informed depository institutions are offered deposit insurance premia contingent on reported capital; the result holds for alternative sorting instruments as well. This suggests a contradiction between deregulation and fairly priced, risk‐sensitive deposit insurance.