The Distribution of Economic Rents Arising from Subsidized Water When Land Is Leased
研究联邦低价水补贴的受益分配，发现现金租赁市场下地主几乎完全获取了租户预期的经济租金，而分成租赁在租户适度风险厌恶时也类似。
Abstract A broad distribution of the benefits of federally “underpriced” water may be best promoted by limiting the size of owned acreage and not the sum of owned and leased acreage as required by the Reclamation Reform Act of 1982. Calculated differences between contractual lease payments and associated tenant‐expected economic rents were statistically tested to determine if landowners fully capture the latter. Cash lease markets transferred nearly all economic rents anticipated by tenants to landowners in the study area. Share lease markets do the same if share tenants are assumed to be moderately risk averse.