Accounting Choices: Variation in Managerial Opportunism
研究发现，管理者对公司资产的管理能力会影响其会计选择：善于管理资产的管理者更少出于机会主义动机操纵应计项目或平滑利润，这解释了不同管理者会计行为的差异。
This study focuses on variation in managers’ accounting choices given motivations to use accounting accruals opportunistically. Prior research identifies a number of motivations arising from accounting–based contracts that encourage opportunistic reporting by managers. However, prior research implicitly assumes all managers respond identically to the same contractual motivations. This study identifies variation in managers’ responses to contractual motivations involving accruals that is related to managers’ stewardship of corporate assets. Evidence shows that modeling how managers use corporate assets enhances the explanation of their accounting choices given motivations to (a) use accruals opportunistically, and (b) to smooth income via accruals. Managers with high ratings on judicious use of corporate assets are less responsive to motivations to use accruals opportunistically, and to smooth income via accruals, than managers with low ratings. This evidence suggests that not all managers are equally opportunistic, and that modeling this factor helps explain cross–sectional differences in managers’ accounting choices.