Job Assignments, Signalling, and Efficiency
分析了一个模型，其中工人能力信息仅直接透露给雇佣企业，其他企业则通过工人的工作分配来推断其能力。研究发现工资与工作关联性强，工作分配常出现低效，且低效程度与经济中企业特定人力资本水平负相关。
This article analyzes a model in which information about a worker's ability is only directly revealed to the firm employing the worker; other firms, however, use the worker's job assignment as a signal of ability. Three results recur throughout the analysis. First, wage rates tend to be more closely associated with jobs than with ability levels. Second, there is frequently an inefficient assignment of workers to jobs (i.e., even when a firm has complete information about a worker's output). Third, the severity of this inefficiency tends to be negatively correlated with the level of firm-specific human capital in the economy.