Bid Rigging and the Threat of Government Prosecution
构建了一个简单投标模型，其中合谋是内生的。买家在一级价格密封拍卖中决定是否串通投标，同时面临政府起诉的威胁。法律机构根据投标情况决定是否调查。在博弈的唯一序贯均衡中，买家以正概率串通，但法律机构仅凭投标无法确定合谋是否发生。
In this article, I develop a simple bidding model in which collusion is endogenous. Buyers at a first-price sealed-bid auction decide whether to rig their bids given that they face the threat of government prosecution. A legal authority chooses whether to investigate the buyers on the basis of the bids tendered. In the unique sequential equilibrium of the game, buyers rig their bids with positive probability, but the legal authority can never ascertain, on the basis of the bids alone, that a conspiracy has formed.