The Benefits of Federalism and the Risk of Overcentralization
分析了联邦制下公民的发言权和退出权如何得到加强，指出中央集权是内生的，政府自私地将任务上移可能导致过度集权，因此未来欧洲宪法应促进联邦制和直接民主以防止这一风险。
In the economic literature on federalism, centralization is frequently identified with overall homogeneous policies, reactions in the post constitutional political process are often neglected, and comparative analysis is rarely carried out. This contribution presents some elements of a more comparative, process oriented approach. The citizens' incentives to make use of the voice and exit options are analyzed. Federalism strengthens both exit and voice. Centralization is endogenous: governments delegate tasks selfishly to higher levels, hence overcentralization may result. A future European constitution should, therefore, promote federalism in order to prevent endogenous overcentralization. This cannot be achieved without strengthening direct democracy. Copyright 1994 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG