Appropriability and Market Structure in a Stochastic Invention Model
通过实验室实验检验随机R&D投资模型的非合作纳什均衡预测，发现可占有性程度与R&D支出负相关，而群体规模增加会提高总R&D支出。
This research examines in the laboratory a class of game-theoretic equilibrium models of private research and development (R&D). We formulate a stochastic model of R&D investment whose predictions can be examined by using laboratory experiments. The noncooperative Nash equilibrium of our operational model yields testable predictions about the effects of appropriability and market structure on R&D. The experimental results support the hypothesis that the degree of appropriability is inversely related to R&D spending. The results strongly support the hypothesis that an increase in group size yields greater aggregate R&D. The noncooperative Nash equilibrium is shown to be a good predictor of central tendencies in the experiments.