Utilitarian mechanism design for an excludable public good
研究可排他公共物品的最优功利主义机制，允许任意准入规则，发现当不平等厌恶足够强时，随机准入是可取的，并给出了随机化不可取的条件。
This paper studies the design of optimal utilitarian mechanisms for an excludable public good. Excludability provides a basis for making people pay for admissions; the payments can be used for redistribution and/or funding. Whereas previous work assumed that admissions are governed by the payment or nonpayment of a price, this paper allows for arbitrary admission rules. With sufficient inequality aversion, nondegenerate randomization in admissions is shown to be desirable for certain model specifications, with and without participation constraints. The paper also gives a sufficient condition on the distribution of preferences under which randomization is undesirable.