Good Fences Make Good Neighbors: A Longitudinal Analysis of an Industry Self-Regulatory Institution
研究了行业自我监管如何应对企业间无形公共资源的溢出危害，以美国化学工业数据表明，重大危机后事故溢出增加，而新机构成立后溢出减少，且机构减轻了参与者对全行业的负面影响。
We extend theories of self-regulation of physical commons to analyze self-regulation of intangible commons in modern industry. We posit that when the action of one firm can cause “spillover” harm to others, firms share a type of commons. We theorize that the need to protect this commons can motivate the formation of a self-regulatory institution. Using data from the U.S. chemical industry, we find that spillover harm from industrial accidents increased after a major industry crisis and decreased following the formation of a new institution. Additionally, our findings suggest that the institution lessened spillovers from participants to the broader industry.