A structural econometric model of family valuation and choice of employer‐sponsored health insurance in the United States
利用1987年全国家庭医疗支出调查数据，构建了一个双职工有孩家庭的结构模型，分析家庭如何在工资与健康保险之间权衡，以最大化不确定医疗需求下的期望效用。
This paper estimates a fully structural unitary household model of employment and health insurance decisions for dual wage-earner families with children in the United States, using data from the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey. Families choose hours of work and the breakdown of compensation between cash wages and health insurance benefits for each wage earner in order to maximize expected utility under uncertain need for medical care. Heterogeneous demand for the employer-sponsored health insurance is thus generated directly from variations in health status and earning potential. The paper concludes by discussing the benefits of using structural models for simulating welfare effects of insurance reform relative to the costly assumptions that must be imposed for identification.