The Organization and Scope of Agents: Regulating Multiproduct Industries
求解一个二维不确定性的机制设计问题，得出规制拥有两种产品边际成本私人信息的垄断者的最优政策，发现信息范围经济（激励互补性）在单一企业生产两种产品时出现，规制者需权衡其与相对绩效激励的利弊。
A mechanism design problem with two-dimensional uncertainty is solved to derive the optimal policy for regulating a monopolist with private information about the marginal cost of producing two different goods. The paper establishes that informational economies of scope, or incentive complementarities, arise when one firm produces both goods. The regulator should weigh these economies against the benefits of relative performance incentives when choosing between integrated and decentralized organizations. Unless the marginal costs of the two products are sufficiently positively correlated, the optimal ex ante policy gives control of both markets to a single firm. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number(s): D82, L22, L51.