Preemptive R&D, Rent Dissipation, and the "Leverage Theory"
在系统市场的先发创新模型中，研究捆绑销售对研发激励的影响，发现捆绑可将一个组件市场的垄断松弛转移到另一个市场，减少系统市场的租金消散，并分析了其福利含义。
This paper provides a new perspective on the validity of the so-called leverage theory. In a model of preemptive innovation in “systems” markets, I examine the effect of bundling on R&D incentives. I find that bundling provides a channel through which monopoly “slack” in one component market can be shifted to another, with the effect of mitigating rent dissipation in the systems market. Bundling can be profitable if this beneficial effect of reduced rent dissipation outweighs the negative effect of intensified price competition. After demonstrating the private optimality of bundling, its welfare implications are considered. Finally, the results can be reinterpreted to analyze the relationship between compatibility decisions and R&D incentives in mix-and-match models.