Management Going‐concern Disclosures: Impact of Corporate Governance and Auditor Reputation
研究英国上市公司董事的持续经营信息披露是否真实，发现公司治理机制和审计师声誉能约束董事更诚实披露，使其与审计师意见更一致。
Abstract The UK regulatory requirements relating to going‐concern disclosures require directors to report on the going‐concern status of their firms. Such directors have incentives not to report fairly in the case of financially‐distressed firms. We expect effective corporate governance mechanisms will encourage directors to report more truthfully in such situations. This paper tests this proposition explicitly using a large sample of going‐concern cases over the period 1994–2000. We find that whereas auditors' going‐concern opinions predict the subsequent resolution of going‐concern uncertainties directors' going‐concern statements convey arbitrary and unhelpful messages to users. However, robust corporate governance structures and high auditor reputation constrain directors to be more truthful in their going‐concern disclosures, bringing these more into line with the more credible auditor opinions.