Trade Unions and Firms' Product Market Power
构建了一个寡头企业与工会有效谈判的生产函数模型，区分产品市场势力和工会势力对经济租金的攫取，并在比利时四个制造业部门进行实证检验，发现产品市场势力被工资租金显著侵蚀，但企业在谈判中保留了大部分势力。
A production function model with efficient bargaining between oligopolistic firms and unions is developed to distinguish between product market power and union power in capturing economic rents. The model is formalised using the generalized Nash bargaining solution, and is empirically tested on four Belgian manufacturing sectors. The conclusions are that product market power is significantly eroded by wage rents, but firms retain most of their power during negotiations. Also, the restrictions imposed on the data do not reject the hypothesis that wage erosion arises from efficient bargaining, in accordance with other empirical findings for Belgian manufacturing.