Monopoly Power and Distribution in Fragmented Markets: The Case of Groundwater
研究巴基斯坦旁遮普地区地下水市场中垄断势力对价格和分配的影响，发现管井所有者对佃户收取更低价格，且双方用水量更大，并探讨了效率和分配含义。
This paper examines monopoly power in the market for groundwater (irrigation water extracted by private tubewells), a market characterized by barriers to entry and spatial fragmentation. In Pakistan's Punjab region, groundwater and tenancy contracts are often interlinked, with share-tenants gaining access to water through the use of their landlord's tubewell. An analysis of groundwater transactions shows that tenants of tubewell owners are charged lower prices than other customers. Tubewell owners and their tenants also use considerably more groundwater on their plots than other farmers. Using detailed price and quantity data, the efficiency and distributional implications of this monopoly power are explored. Copyright 2004, Wiley-Blackwell.