The Selection of Preferences Through Imitation
建立了一个模型，其中一群代理人反复与自然博弈，其行为规则通过模仿过程随时间修正。对于二元决策，模仿会选择与SSB效用理论和后悔理论一致的偏好关系；对于三个及以上选项，长期趋势是选择SSB偏好下最优的选项，若无最优选项则模仿过程可能不收敛。
The paper presents a model in which a population of agents repeatedly play games against nature; the rules of behaviour followed are revised over time through a process of imitation. For binary decisions, imitation selects rules consistent with a preference relation of the kind proposed by SSB utility theory and regret theory. In general, this preference relation need not satisfy either independence or transitivity; we state conditions on imitation necessary for it to do so. For decisions over three or more options, the long-run tendency is for options that are maximally preferred in terms of SSB preferences to be chosen. If no maximally preferred option exists, the process of imitation may not converge.