The Robustness of Honesty Effects on Budget Proposals when the Superior has Rejection Authority
通过两个实验，研究了上级拥有否决权时，诚实对预算松弛的影响是否稳健。发现减少分配公平的显著性时诚实仍有强效应，增加互惠显著性时亦然，表明诚实效应总体稳健。
ABSTRACT Rankin, Schwartz, and Young (2008) find experimental evidence that manipulating whether the budget request of the subordinate requires a factual assertion has no effect on budgetary slack when the superior can reject the budget. This calls into question the role of honesty in participative budgeting settings. Using Rankin et al.'s (2008) manipulation to capture honesty effects, we examine the robustness of honesty effects on budget proposals when the superior has rejection authority in two experiments. In Experiment 1, we document that honesty has a strong effect on budgetary slack when the salience of distributional fairness is reduced by withholding the relative pay of the superior from the subordinate. In Experiment 2, we document that honesty continues to have a strong effect on budgetary slack when the salience of reciprocity is increased by giving the superior the ability to set the subordinate's salary. Thus, our evidence suggests that honesty effects on budget proposals are generally robust to giving the superior rejection authority. Our study helps explain prior experimental results and clarifies the role of honesty in participative budgeting settings. Data Availability: Experimental data are available from the authors upon request.