Long-term Competition in a Dynamic Game: The Cold Fish War
构建了一个动态博弈模型，研究资源开采中可信、自愿的集体协议，通过完美均衡和再谈判约束分析协议可行性，对理解渔业等公共资源长期合作有参考价值。
This article presents a model of credible, voluntary, collective agreements in a dynamic game. These agreements are implicit in collections of history-dependent (threat) strategies. I consider the strategies in a game of resource exploitation. Credibility is represented by perfect equilibrium. Voluntarism requires at least that all behavior be supported by the threat of collapse of the agreement, which would return the players to the memoryless equilibrium. Collective rationality requires that the agreement be robust to the possibility of mutually beneficial renegotiation. I analyze the set of agreements meeting each of these restrictions.