Trust, Reciprocity, and Favors in Cooperative Relationships
研究了重复信任博弈中，信任和互惠如何通过恩惠交换机制实现合作，发现恩惠随时间衰减及对称惩罚能提升合作效率，对理解人际关系中的信任动态有参考价值。
We study trust, reciprocity, and favors in a repeated trust game with private information. In our main analysis, players are willing to exhibit trust and thereby facilitate cooperative gains only if such behavior is regarded as a favor that must be reciprocated, either immediately or in the future. The size of a favor owed may decline over time, following neutral periods. Indeed, a favor-exchange relationship with this feature improves on a simple favor-exchange relationship. In some settings, an infrequent and symmetric punishment sustains greater cooperation. A honeymoon period followed by favor-exchange or symmetric punishment can also offer scope for improvement.