The Evolution of Property Rights
构建了一个“最优公地”模型，说明产权形式取决于资源使用者之间的交易成本与排他成本之间的相互作用，并讨论了人口和经济增长在不同条件下如何导致产权向私有或公有方向演变。
A model of the "optimal commons" shows how property tenures result from the interaction of transactions costs among those people using a resource in common and the costs of excluding noncommoners. The model shows that, under some circumstances, demographic and economic growth will induce a change toward individual property, while under other circumstances, growth can lead toward common property. Empirical examples of these shifts are discussed. Collective governance institutions are critical to the process; in fact, changes in governance institutions can lead to property rights changes in the absence of changes in underlying economic factors. Copyright 1989 by WWZ and Helbing & Lichtenhahn Verlag AG