On the Efficiency of Decentralized Exchange with Resale Possibilities
研究当允许转售时，通过双边匹配和讨价还价进行的去中心化交易能否实现有效配置。发现耐用品配置有效，但消耗品未必，这对理解市场效率有启示。
This paper studies decentralized exchange by bilateral matching and bargaining when resale is possible. Decentralized exchange involves the risk that goods and services may be allocated inefficiently; if low‐valuation buyers consume while high‐valuation buyers do not, then social welfare is reduced. If resale is possible and transaction costs are negligible, we would nevertheless expect an efficient allocation to result from decentralized exchange. This paper suggests that this depends on the nature of the commodity; while the allocation of a durable good will be efficient, the allocation of a “consumable” good need not.