Challengers, Elites, and Owning Families: A Social Class Theory of Corporate Acquisitions in the 1960s
研究了1960年代末461家美国大型工业企业参与多元化收购浪潮的原因，提出并检验了基于社会阶级的理论，发现由社交网络中心但社会地位边缘的挑战者领导、不受家族控制的企业更可能进行收购。
This paper analyzes data on 461 large U.S. industrial corporations to determine the factors that led large firms to participate in the wave of diversifying acquisitions that peaked in the late 1960s. We elaborate and test a class theory of corporate acquisitions, maintaining that firms pursued acquisitions in this period when they were commanded by well-networked challengers who were central in elite social networks but relatively marginal with respect to social status, isolated from the resistance of established elites, and free from control of owning families. We also consider a wide range of factors highlighted by alternative accounts of acquisition likelihood, including resource dependence, institutional pressures, and principal-agent conflicts. The results provide support for our main theoretical arguments, even when controls related to alternative explanations are taken into account.