Land Development and Pigouvian Taxes: The Case of Peatland
在动态框架下分析竞争性企业面临负生产外部性时最优庇古税的确定，发现社会净收益函数为凸时无需庇古税或征税会导致不开发土地，为凹时庇古税为线性或非线性税。
Abstract In this paper the determination of an optimal Pigouvian tax for a competitive firm when a negative production externality is present concurrent with the development of land for production purposes is analyzed within a dynamic framework. Conditions are established for a convex social net return function where a Pigouvian tax is not required or where the imposition of a Pigouvian tax leads to the decision not to develop the land at all. In the case of a concave social net return function the Pigouvian tax is either a linear or a nonlinear tax on the private net returns.