Employment With Asymmetric Information
研究企业家比工人更了解自然状态时，劳动契约如何影响资源配置，发现信息不对称通常导致风险和努力分配次优，在消费与休闲完全替代时，除最有利状态外雇佣均低于帕累托最优。
In an economy without informational and other distortions, entrepreneurs and workers can write labor contracts that support a Pareto optimal allocation of resources. This paper is an attempt to characterize contracts when enterpreneurs are better informed about the state of nature than are their workers. Asymmetric information generally results in a suboptimal allocation of both risk and worker effort; in particular, if consumption and leisure are perfect substitutes, employment will be less than fully Pareto optimal in all but the most favorable states of nature.