The Implications of Competition Among Jurisdictions: Does Tiebout Need Politics?
研究管辖区间竞争是否足以确保地方公共品有效供给，发现即使居民可以自由迁移，政府仍能攫取土地租金，竞争无法完全消除政府自由裁量权。
The paper investigates whether compensation among local jurisdiction is, by itself, sufficient to ensure efficient provision of local public goods. Jurisdictions have fixed boundaries, and each has an entrenched government with the power to tax and supply the public good. Residents can move costlessly among jurisdictions. It is shown that competition among numerous jurisdictions is not sificient to guarantee public sector efficiency. Though residents can "vote with their feet," land is immobile. Hence, governments can unsurp some land rents for their own ends. Increasing the number of jurisdictions limits but cannot completely eliminate the ability to exercise discretionary governmental power.