Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs
建立了一个和解与诉讼模型，分析诉讼成本分配制度对审判概率的影响，发现当双方对胜诉概率有共同信念且原告保留全部和解金时，成本分配不影响审判概率；否则成本分配成为重要决定因素。
This article examines a model of settlement and litigation in which the plaintiff makes a settlement demand based upon his true level of damages; the defendant infers the plaintiff's true damage level and decides whether to go to trial. When both parties share common beliefs about the likelihood of judgment in favor of the plaintiff (but not necessarily about the expected award) and when the plaintiff retains the entire settlement, then the system for allocating litigation costs does not affect the equilibrium probability of trial. If either of these two assumptions is violated, then the litigation cost allocation system becomes an important determinant of the equilibrium probability of trial.