On the Size of U.S. Government: Political Economy in the Neoclassical Growth Model
在新古典增长模型中构建了Meltzer-Richard中位选民模型的动态版本，用美国数据校准后，模型预测的转移支付规模与实际数据相当接近。
We study a dynamic version of Meltzer and Richard's median-voter model of the size of government. Taxes are proportional to total income, and they are redistributed as equal lump-sum transfers. Voting takes place periodically over time, and each consumer votes for the tax rate that maximizes his equilibrium utility. We calibrate the model to U.S. data. Key elements in the calibration are the income and wealth distribution and the parameters governing the leisure and consumption choices. The total size of transfers predicted by our political-economy model is quite close to the size of transfers in the data.