Estimating the Value of Proposal Power
利用1991年和1998年美国交通项目分配数据，发现拥有提案权力的议员（交通授权委员会成员）为其选区争取到更多项目支出，验证了立法谈判模型的关键定性预测。
This paper investigates the role of proposal power in the allocation of transportation projects across U.S. congressional districts in 1991 and 1998. The evidence supports the key qualitative prediction of legislative bargaining models: members with proposal power -- those sitting on the transportation authorization committee -- secure more project spending for their districts than do other representatives. Support for the quantitative restrictions on the value of proposal power is more mixed. I then empirically address several alternative models of legislative behavior, including partisan models, informational roles for committees, models with appropriations committees, and theories of committees as preference outliers.