Oligopoly Limit Pricing
将Milgrom和Roberts的限制定价模型扩展到多个在位者的情况，发现在位者无法协调欺骗，导致分离均衡且进入前价格无扭曲，而合理的混同均衡不存在或导致价格向下扭曲。
We expand Milgrom and Roberts' (1982) limit pricing model to allow for multiple incumbents. Each incumbent is informed as to the level of an industry cost parameter and selects a preentry price while a single entrant observes each incumbent's preentry price. We find that incumbents are unable to coordinate deception, which results in a separating equilibrium in which preentry prices are not distorted. Further, introducing the refinement of unprejudiced beliefs, we show that the no-distortion equilibrium is the only refined separating equilibrium. Plausible pooling equilibria fail to exist or involve downward distortions in preentry prices.