Price Competition between Market Makers
建模了金融市场中做市商在未知未来需求前报价的价格竞争，发现做市商数量增加会提高个体风险暴露和买卖价差，增加流动性交易者成本，特定条件下流动性交易者更偏好垄断做市商。
The paper explicitly models price competition in financial markets in which prices are quoted by competing dealers before future demand is observed. The strategic behaviour of informed insiders and uninformed liquidity traders implies that a growing number of market makers leads to a higher risk exposure for the individual market maker which induces higher individual bid-ask-spreads and higher transaction costs for the liquidity traders. Under certain conditions liquidity traders would prefer a monopolistic market maker rather than several competing market makers. The results hold under various assumptions on the strategy space of the market makers.