Efficient Provision of a Discrete Public Good
在贝叶斯框架下，针对具有阈值生产函数的离散公共品，构建了当外部选择为零效用或自愿/强制贡献时的有效分配机制，适用于投票、征兵等场景。
A discrete public good is characterized by a threshold production function: the good is provided if a certain number of contributors is reached. I consider a Bayesian framework where an individual's cost associated with his participation in the provision of a public good is private information. An efficient allocation mechanism is constructed when the outside option-available to individuals refusing to participate in the mechanism-is zero utility, and also for uniform uncertainty when the outside option is either voluntary contribution or forced contribution. Many economic situations are examples of strategic coordination decisions in which on the one hand, participation in the collective action generates a positive social surplus, and on the other, an individual's own benefit depends upon the decisions of others. A particular example of this situation is the provision of a discrete public good. A discrete public good is characterized by a threshold production function: the good is provided if a certain amount of contributions is reached. Intriguing examples and insights related to this kind of public good are provided in Schelling (1960, 1978). The primary objective of this study is to present an efficient resource allocation mechanism in situations where discrete public good is present. Specific applications of the model presented below include voting for referenda where a quorum of votes is required, the military draft, or the staffing of a wild life refuge. Less obviously, the model can also be conceived as encompassing some features of R&D activities with spillover effects. I consider a Bayesian framework where each individual has private information about the cost associated with his participation in the provision of a public good, the costs of other individuals being independently distributed random variables. It is assumed, however, that the cost distribution is such that it is always efficient to provide the public good, that is, the collective benefit from the provision of the public good exceeds the collective cost. Furthermore, efficiency considerations require the good to be provided by low cost individuals. I focus on revelation mechanisms whereby allocation is determined by the social planner on the basis of the individuals' cost reports. These mechanisms should satisfy several require