Decentralized Supply Chains with Competing Retailers Under Demand Uncertainty
研究需求不确定下，多个竞争零售商的分权供应链的均衡行为，并设计契约使分权链达到集权链绩效，对供应链管理者和学者有参考价值。
In this paper, we investigate the equilibrium behavior of decentralized supply chains with competing retailers under demand uncertainty. We also design contractual arrangements between the parties that allow the decentralized chain to perform as well as a centralized one. We address these questions in the context of two-echelon supply chains with a single supplier servicing a network of (competing) retailers, considering the following general model: Retailers face random demands, the distribution of which may depend only on its own retail price (noncompeting retailers) or on its own price as well as those of the other retailers (competing retailers), according to general stochastic demand functions.