Shareholder access to manager-biased courts and the monitoring/litigation trade-off
模型显示，当法院偏向管理者时，降低股东诉讼门槛可能因过度诉讼或过度监督而降低效率，并导致更集中的所有权结构。
Facilitating access to courts for outside shareholders is often viewed as a remedy against managerial opportunism. My model shows that, when courts are biased toward managers, reducing the barriers to shareholder suits can lower efficiency because it can lead to either excessive litigation or excessive monitoring of managers by shareholders. The latter effect implies that easy shareholder litigation may lead to a greater use of substitute mechanisms of corporate governance rather than more reliance on the judiciary. I also show that easy shareholder access to manager-biased courts leads to the formation of more, rather than less, concentrated ownership structures.