Bank Competition and Credit Standards
解释了银行信贷标准和价格竞争随经济周期大幅变化的原因：经济前景改善时，借款人违约概率下降，银行筛选强度呈倒U形，导致扩张期价格竞争激烈、信贷标准放松，衰退期则收紧。
This article offers an explanation for the substantial variation of credit standards and price competition among banks over the business cycle. As the economic outlook improves, the average default probabilities of borrowers decline. This affects the profitability of screening and causes bank screening intensity to display an inverse U-shape as a function of economic prospects. Low screening activity in expansions creates intense price competition among lenders and loans are extended to lower-quality borrowers. As the economic outlook worsens, price competition diminishes, and credit standards tighten significantly. Deposit insurance may contribute to the countercyclical variation of credit standards. Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.