Maintaining Quality Standards in Franchise Chains
识别了特许经营连锁所服务市场的特征，这些特征决定了连锁所有者监控单个加盟商行为的相对激励。研究发现，所有者更有动力监控服务较小市场或需求波动较大的门店，而与其他连锁的竞争程度对监控激励的影响不明确。
In the present paper we identify those characteristics of the markets served by a franchise chain which determine the relative incentives of the owner of the chain to monitor the behavior of individual franchisees. We find that the owner has greater incentives to monitor the outlets that serve the relatively smaller markets and those that are subject to greater fluctuations in the state of the demand confronting them. We also find that the extent of competition with other chains has an ambiguous effect on the incentives to monitor the franchisees: