Civil institutions and evolution: Concepts, critique and models
探讨公民规范与演化的关系，认为长期存续的规范需具备最低效率，并批判演化博弈模型更适用于动物行为，尝试为人类博弈提出新解概念。
The paper examines the relation between civil norms and evolution. The survival of norms in the long run may depend on the evolutionary process and natural selection. The sieve of natural selection may ensure that norms which persist must have minimal efficiency properties. This paper begins with a general discussion of evolutionary processes and the survival of civil institutions. It then presents an introductory account of the theory of evolutionary games. It is argued that the model of evolutionary games is more suited to analyzing animal behaviour than the human one. Since it is the latter that is of interest to economists, an attempt is made in this paper to develop some new solution concepts which are more apt for human games.