Ownership Concentration, Corporate Control Activity, and Firm Value: Evidence from the Death of Inside Blockholders
通过分析内部大股东去世的影响，发现股权集中度下降、股东财富增加，且多数公司成为控制权竞标目标，支持了股权集中度与企业价值关系的理论模型。
ABSTRACT We analyze how ownership concentration affects firm value and control of public companies by examining effects of deaths of inside blockholders. We find shareholder wealth increases, ownership concentration falls, and extensive corporate control activity ensues. Share price responses are related to the deceased's equity stake. Control group holdings fall for two‐thirds of the firms due to either the estate's dispersal or inheritors selling stock. A majority of firms become targets of control bids: three‐quarters of bids are successful; one‐third are hostile. Our evidence is broadly consistent with Stulz's (1988) model of the relationship between ownership concentration and firm value.