Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
提出一种更一般的拍卖模型，竞标者针对拍卖人的不同行动提供菜单式报价，证明在完全信息下存在有效率的纳什均衡，并应用于经济影响场景。
In many examples of competitive bidding (e.g., government construction contracting) the relevant object is either partially divisible or ill-defined, in contrast to much of the recent theoretical work on auctions. In this paper we consider a more general class of auctions, in which bidders name a "menu" of offers for various possible actions (allocations) available to the auctioneer. We focus upon "first-price" menu auctions under the assumption of complete information, and show that, for an attractive refinement of the set of Nash Equilibria, an efficient action always results. Our model also has application to situations of economic influence, in which interested parties independently attempt to influence a decision-maker's action.