Power and Conflicts of Interest in Professional Firms: Evidence from Investment Banking
研究了专业事务所中代表不同利益方的代理人之间的利益冲突如何解决，发现证券分析师会对自己客户公司的股票给出更有利的评级，而分析师及其部门的声誉会减弱这种偏差。
We study the resolution of conflicts of interest that arise when actors in professional firms represent separate parties with competing interests, using models of power and reputation to predict the resolution of such conflicts. We tested models on an initial sample of over 8,000 security analysts' ratings of corporate equity securities. Results show that analysts rate their clients' securities more favorably than other analysts rating the same securities. This positive bias is moderated by the reputation of the analyst and his or her department. Implications and extensions for organizational theory, multiservice professional firms, and security market regulation are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]