反收购措施、金色降落伞与目标公司股东福利

Antitakeover Measures, Golden Parachutes, and Target Firm Shareholder Welfare

RAND Journal of Economics · 1990
被引 136
人大 AFT50ABS 4

中文导读

分析反收购措施如何增强目标公司管理层的谈判能力,从而为股东争取更多并购收益,并探讨在管理层损失较大时,搭配金色降落伞的最优方案。

Abstract

Adopting antitakeover measures can enable the shareholders of a targetfirm to increase their share of any synergy gains expected to result from combining their firm with a bidder. Adopting such measures enhances the bargaining power of the target's manager, who will be a tougher bargainer than the nonmanagerial shareholders will, owing to his expected loss of his job following the target's acquisition. If the manager's expected loss of utility is very large, targetfirm shareholders may maximize their takeover-related gain by both adopting antitakeover measures and awarding the manager a golden parachute of the optimal size.

反收购措施金降落伞目标公司股东福利议价能力