Auctions for Oil and Gas Leases with an Informed Bidder and a Random Reservation Price
分析了一个第一价格密封投标拍卖，其中标的物具有未知的共同价值，但一个买家比其他人拥有更多信息，且保留价格与知情买家的信息相关。研究得出了知情买家更可能提交低出价等结论，并用联邦海上排水租赁的投标数据验证了这些限制条件。
The paper analyzes a first price, sealed bid auction with a random reservation price where the object has an unknown common value, but one buyer has better information than the others. We permit the reservation price to be correlated with the information of the informed buyer, which reflects both his assessment of the value of the object and probability of rejection at any bid. Assuming all random variables are affiliated, we establish the following results. (1) The rate of increase in the distribution of the uninformed bidder is never greater than the rate of increase in the distribution of the informed bid. (2) The distributions are identical at bids above the support of the reservation price. (3) The informed buyer is more likely to submit low bids. We demonstrate that these restrictions are satisfied by bid data from the federal sales of offshore drainage leases.