Ex Ante Severance Agreements and Earnings Management
研究离职补偿协议能否减少欺诈性盈余管理，发现高离职补偿的美国大公司更少被SEC处罚，且更少通过异常应计项目达到分析师预测，表明离职补偿缓解了高管的职业担忧。
Abstract This research studies whether severance agreements may reduce fraudulent earnings management, and whether severance pay mitigates executives’ career concerns. In a sample of large U.S. firms, those with higher severance pay are less likely to be subject to accounting and auditing enforcement releases ( AAER s) by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ( SEC ). Among S&P 500 firms in the post‐ SOX period with premanaged earnings below analyst forecasts, firms with higher severance pay are less likely to meet/beat the analyst forecast using abnormal accruals. Overall, these results suggest that fear of losing a lucrative severance package, and/or the insurance offered by such a package curbs earnings management.