Efficient Wage Bargaining as a Repeated Game
在垄断工会模型和有效谈判模型之间建立桥梁，考虑工资谈判的重复博弈性质，发现均衡效率介于两者之间，并应用于美国钢铁行业、工资让步等问题。
This paper builds a bridge between the two existing approaches for wage and employment determination in a unionized market: the monopoly union model and the efficient bargaining model. Both fail to capture the dynamic aspects of wage bargaining. When the repeated nature of the wage bargaining process is considered, the equilibria are neither as inefficient as the monopoly union model predicts nor as fully efficient. Rather, the two models can be regarded as particular cases with certain discount rates. We apply our model to issues such as the endgame interpretation of the U. S. steel industry, wage concessions, and featherbedding.