Disclosure Policy and Industry Fluctuations
研究了重复寡头市场中企业的自愿披露行为如何随行业波动影响定价和利润，发现高集中度或低资本成本行业倾向于不披露，而部分披露会抑制冲击传播。
This paper examines voluntary disclosures in a repeated oligopoly and their association with price-setting behavior and industry profits along industrial fluctuations. The analysis focuses on the collectively optimal equilibrium among oligopoly firms. We show that, in industries that are highly concentrated or feature low cost of capital, nondisclosure is prevalent and results in stable product prices and high profit margins. Otherwise, firms may selectively disclose to soften competition in the product market. Under partial disclosure, firms withhold information during sharp industry expansions or declines. Consequently, the disclosure policy dampens the dissemination of shocks to the industry. This paper was accepted by Mary Barth, accounting.