Improving Incentives in Unemployment Insurance: A Review of Recent Research
综述了近期关于如何改善失业保险中激励的研究，重点关注福利支付时长、监控与制裁、以及工作福利三种工具，并指出对不积极求职者施加惩罚的理论依据较为坚实，且实证研究支持这一结论。
Abstract. This paper provides a review of the recent literature on how incentives in unemployment insurance can be improved. We are particularly concerned with three instruments, i.e. the duration of benefit payments (or more generally the time sequencing of benefits), monitoring in conjunction with sanctions, and workfare. Our reading of the theoretical literature is that the case for imposing a penalty on less active job search is fairly solid. A growing number of empirical studies, including randomized experiments, are in line with this conclusion.