SPATIAL COMPETITION WITH CONSISTENT CONJECTURES*
研究了企业在空间竞争中持有正确猜测（一致猜测）时的价格与选址均衡，发现最简单情况下猜测值为1/3，并随需求弹性、维度及竞争者数量变化。
ABSTRACT Equilibrium in spatial models invariably depends on firms' conjectures about how competitors will react to their price changes. This paper analyzes spatial price and location equilibrium when firms hold consistent (i.e. correct) conjectures. Most spatial models assume an exogenous conjecture. Consistent conjectures are one method, albeit a controversial one, for endogenizing the conjecture. We show that the consistent conjecture about a competitor's reaction to a price change in the simplest case is 1/3. When demand is elastic the consistent conjecture is a decreasing function of the radius. It is always below 1/3 and can be negative. In the third model, we show that the consistent conjecture declines as the number of dimensions and the number of competitors increases.